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23 August 1960

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


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23 AUGUST 1960

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Mali Federation dispute may come to UN Security Council.

III. THE WEST

Pro-Castro demonstrations likely in Latin American countries in attempt to influence OAS foreign ministers' meeting.

West German ambassador in Moscow does not expect autumn Bundestag meeting in Berlin.

LATE ITEMS

The situation in the Congo.

The situation in Laos


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 August 1960

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Mali Federation: [The situation in the Mali Federation--split by Senegal's secession on 20 August--may come before the UN Security Council if the appeals of Senegalese and Soudanese leaders are heeded. Modibo Keita, president of the Mali Council of Ministers and premier of Soudan, has requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council and military assistance to counteract action of the Senegalese Government, while Senegal has requested admission to the UN as a separate country. Keita's action follows his unsuccessful appeal to France to assume treaty obligations regarding assistance in the maintenance of Mali's security.]

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III. THE WEST

Cuba: Communists and other pro-Castro elements in a number of Latin American countries are likely to attempt demonstrations this week designed to influence the OAS foreign ministers' meeting. Such demonstrations, encouraged and probably largely financed by the Castro regime, were attempted with only limited success last week in Uruguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Ecuador. Demonstrations this week might have the effect of further hardening official sentiment against Castro in the hemisphere. In Costa Rica, the local security forces demonstrated ability and determination to maintain order during the first week of OAS meetings, but the real test will probably come this week. (Page 3)

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West Germany: [Following conversations with Chancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Brentano, West German Ambassador to Moscow Hans Kroll feels it now is virtually certain that no Bundestag meeting will be held in Berlin before November. In a radio speech on 21 August, West Berlin Mayor Brandt again demanded such a meeting be held despite Soviet threats to sign a separate East German peace treaty. Although Brandt claimed British support for his position, the British Government has recently indicated opposition to the holding of the Bundestag meeting in Berlin in the near future on grounds that this might provoke the USSR.]

INATION) EMB Moscow 480, 20 Aug 60 (Secret s/s BUO);
EMB London 821, 17 Aug 60 (Conf s/s); UPT W 0
5-32 Berlin 21 Aug 60 (Uncl)

LATE ITEMS

*Congo: Premier Lumumba's modification of certain of his charges against the UN probably stemmed from failure of other African nations to give him full support. Although he will continue to press the UN concerning Katanga, for the time being he may not demand total withdrawal of UN forces from the Congo. The UN Security Council president, in a statement of the majority view on 22 August, upheld Hammarskjold's authority and his interpretations of the council's previous Congo resolutions.

Brussels' reported agreement to withdraw its remaining forces--about 6,000 men--from its Congo bases will partially undercut anti-Belgian propaganda at the conference of African foreign ministers scheduled to begin in Leopoldville on 25 August. The Belgians plan to retain "technicians" at the bases, however, and continue to regard their disposition as a subject for negotiation with the Congo Government.

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Laos: [Premier Souvanna Phouma, Lao Army commander General Ouane, a representative of rebel Captain Kong Le, and the United Nations deputy representative in Laos arrived in Savannakhet on 23 August to attempt to reach a settlement with General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup group. They presumably will stress the danger that rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le, whose troops control the Vientiane area, will join forces with the pro-Communist Pathet Lao dissidents if Phoumi persists in attempting to nullify the coup. The degree of present collusion between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao is unclear, but General Ouane has stated that talks have been held and that the "Pathets would attack Phoumi's forces for us" in any move against Vientiane. There are indications that General Phoumi hopes to set up a rival government at his headquarters in Savannakhet, where nearly a quorum of National Assembly deputies thus far have rallied.] (Page 7)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Situation in Mali Federation

[The political dispute between secessionist Senegal and the Soudanese leaders who want to preserve the identity of the Mali Federation is moving into the international arena and threatens to involve the United Nations. Senegal has already applied for admission to the United Nations as a separate country, and Modibo Keita, president of the Mali Council of Ministers and premier of Soudan, has asked the American Embassy in Dakar to transmit an appeal to the UN secretary general asking for an immediate meeting of the Security Council and for military assistance. He claims that Senegal's secession endangers public order and world peace. If Hammarskjold does not call a security council meeting on his own authority, the appeal must be presented by a member of the United Nations. In this case, one of the African states might be willing to satisfy this requirement.]


[Paris has maintained its neutral position. President de Gaulle has indicated he would be happy to receive both leaders in Paris to discuss the new relationships arising from Senegal's secession and to try to reconcile differences between them. Senegal's Premier Dia left on 22 August for Paris, and Keita announced that he would consider De Gaulle's invitation. However, in a public message to the French Government, Keita was critical of Paris' recognition of a rupture in the Federation.] [] Meanwhile, Senegal has asked for recognition from several countries including Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.] []

[In Dakar, where the Senegalese Government is in complete control, officials have begun to set up the apparatus of an independent country. Legislative commissions have been set up to study the transformation of the legislative assembly into a national assembly--the assembly approved such a bill]

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[unanimously on 22 August--to suggest necessary revisions of the constitution, and to consider a national Senegalese flag.]



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Pro-Castro Demonstrations May Occur This Week in a
Number of Latin American Countries

Communists and other pro-Castro elements in a number of Latin American countries are likely to attempt demonstrations this week designed to influence the OAS foreign ministers who reconvened in Costa Rica on 22 August to consider the threat to the inter-American system posed by Soviet bloc ties to the Castro regime. Such demonstrations, encouraged and probably largely financed by the Castro regime, were attempted last week in Uruguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Ecuador, but with limited success.

In Uruguay, about 5,000 pro-Castro demonstrators stoned the US Embassy in the first show of violence against the embassy in recent years. A simultaneous student demonstration in support of the OAS aroused favorable comment among Uruguayans.

In El Salvador, Communist-led demonstrators damaged the plant of a conservative newspaper on 16 August and would also probably have attacked the US Embassy had it not been guarded by police. The subsequent arrest of Communist leaders and pro-Communist students who participated in this demonstration prompted a second student demonstration on 19 August. The embassy expects further agitation and disorders and possibly a student strike.

In Ecuador, pro-Castro demonstrations in Guayaquil were suppressed without serious difficulty on 18 August, and an attempt in Venezuela to stage a pro-Castro demonstration on 16 August failed in the face of obvious government efforts to thwart it and the warning that militants of President Betancourt's Democratic Action party would stage counterdemonstrations.

[REDACTED]

Cuban efforts to stimulate pro-Castro agitation [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a number of
Mexican labor unions appealing for "acts of solidarity and

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support for the Cuban revolution" [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

The Costa Rican security forces have demonstrated their effectiveness in maintaining order during the OAS meetings. Costa Rican Communists are probably planning street demonstrations this week, but the local security forces are believed capable of preventing their entry into the cordoned-off area surrounding the conference site. [redacted]
[redacted]

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The Situation in the Congo

Premier Lumumba's modification of certain of his charges against the UN probably stemmed from the failure of other African nations to give him full support. Although he will continue to press the UN concerning Katanga, for the time being he may not demand withdrawal of all UN forces from the Congo. The UN Security Council president, in a statement of the majority view on 22 August, upheld Secretary General Hammarskjold's authority and his interpretations of the council's previous Congo resolutions.

Brussels' reported agreement to withdraw its remaining forces--about 6,000 men--from its Congo bases may serve to undercut anti-Belgian propaganda at the conference of African foreign ministers in Leopoldville beginning on 25 August. The Belgians plan to retain "technicians" at the bases, however, and continue to regard their eventual disposition as subject to negotiations with the Congo Government.

The tone of the Leopoldville meeting is also likely to be affected by African doubts concerning Lumumba's attacks on the UN. Ghana's foreign minister stated on 19 August that he expects the initial sessions to be held on the foreign-minister level, with subsequent sessions among heads of state to be held in either Leopoldville or Accra.

The meeting, as first projected by Lumumba and Ghanaian President Nkrumah, was designed in part as a forum to dramatize African support for a united Congo. More recently, however, African backing for Lumumba has become less firm.

[redacted]
[redacted] "strict caution" concerning the Congo problem and characterized the meeting merely as an occasion for "formulating a concerted African policy" on the Congo. [redacted]
[redacted]

In Elisabethville in Katanga, a conference between provincial President Moise Tshombé and officials of the anti-Lumumba

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Abako party is the first known effort by the two opposition groups to work out a common plan of action. Lumumba continues to suppress opposition in Leopoldville Province; anti-Lumumba moves in the Congo Senate may have prompted the arrest of a legislator from Lumumba's own party, despite his legislative immunity.

The USSR continues its strong support of the Lumumba government. On 20 and 21 August, Moscow protested as "completely inadmissible" Hammarskjold's plan for a civilian UN administration in the Congo, demanded the immediate withdrawal of Canadian forces, and issued its fourth official statement on the Congo crisis, again warning that "peace-loving countries" would have to take "other steps" if Belgian troops are not withdrawn and alleged plans to "dismember" the Congo are not abandoned. [REDACTED]

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Situation in Laos

[Premier Souvanna Phouma, accompanied by Lao army commander General Ouane, a representative of rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le, and the United Nations deputy representative in Laos, flew from Vientiane to Savannakhet on 23 August for negotiations with General Phoumi, leader of the countercoup movement. Presumably, the delegation will stress the danger that rebel paratroop Captain Kong Le, whose troops firmly control the Vientiane area, will join forces with the pro-Communist Pathet Lao dissidents if Phoumi persists in attempting to nullify the 9 August coup and succeeding developments.]

[The high-level composition of this delegation should facilitate the task of reaching a compromise settlement of differences. However, Phoumi may still question the extent of Souvanna's real authority, and may have in mind the creation of a rival government to challenge the Souvanna regime, which he considers illegal. The gravitation of Lao VIPs to Savannakhet continues. Prince Boun Oum Na Champassak, inspector general of the kingdom, arrived on 21 August via Thailand after flight from Vientiane. Leaflets dropped in Vientiane on 22 August requested pro-Phoumi deputies to re-form the National Assembly at Savannakhet. The arrival of three more deputies reported en route from Vientiane would bring the unofficial count of deputies at Savannakhet to 25, or five short of a quorum.]

[The bulk of the 800 battle-hardened troops of Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion reportedly have set up a defense perimeter several miles outside Vientiane, and Pathet Lao elements apparently are also in blocking position astride road and river approaches to the capital.]

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[redacted] General Ouane told the American army attaché in Vientiane on 22 August that "the Pathet Lao would attack Phoumi's forces for us" if an attack were made on Vientiane.]

[The degree of present collusion between Kong Le and the Pathet Lao is unclear. General Ouane confirms that talks have been held but states that no liaison exists. [redacted]

[redacted] the coup forces have issued Lao army uniforms and arms from supply depots in Vientiane to Pathet Lao elements and civilian partisans. Estimates of Pathet Lao strength in the Vientiane vicinity vary from several hundred to 2,000: the lower figure is believed more accurate.] [redacted]

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

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